An attempt to go beyond the press release.
Some questions on announcements relating to ordnance and ammunition.
In an excellent essay on the Centre for Public Understanding of Defence and Security website, Clifford Beale set out a strong case for why ‘National Defence needs a Fourth Estate’. In the essay he points to the paucity of reporting on national defence by ‘trusted’ media organisations. The general public understanding of defence is, in my view constrained by two factors – the public does not experience defence as it experiences other Government functions and there is a tendency to believe it is all top secret and is being dealt with by very clever people. The media announcements of the Government and other members of the defence establishment, such as industry, which are inevitably of the ‘everything is splendid and there is nothing to see here’ variety, reinforce the latter tendency either inadvertently or deliberately.
Given that one of the areas where I have some, admittedly imperfect, knowledge is the supply chain and industrial base that deliveres 155mm artillery and Main Battle Tank (MBT) ordnance and ammunition and given that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has led to a flurry of announcements in both of these areas, I thought it may improve public understanding to pose some questions that go beyond the media announcements. First some context.
Artillery is normally an indirect fire weapon, that is engaging targets that the operator cannot see and MBTs usually engage targets that are in the operators field of vision as augmented by sesnsors. Tube Artillery, as opposed to Rocket Artillery, is an area effect weapon, which means it deploys massive force over large areas. Whilst the use of drones has changed artillery tactics with counter fire now a greater risk, the system still demands large quantities of so called dumb ammunition that is relatively cheap and smaller quantities of expensive precision guided munitions, although the USA is the only NATO nation to hold meaningful quantities of such projectiles. The ammunition is fired from howitzers that are either self-propelled, that is integral to a vehicle, or towed behind another vehicle. In NATO the standard calibre for tube artillery is 155mm and the standard length of the barrel is either thirty nine times that calibre or fifty two times that calibre.
The standard NATO ammunition is High Explosive, which in terms of quantities is dominant, whilst smoke and illuminating are used in support of infantry. The ammunition consists of a projectile that is a metal case with a payload, a base, and a fuze. The High Explosive can have a point detonating or a proximity fuze function and the smoke and illuminating projectiles use time fuzes. The key processes in the manufacture of the projectile are: forging and machining the projectile body; producing the payload, loading the payload and producing the fuze. The artillery round is completed by a propelling charge that uses propellant produced from nitro cellulose, nitro-glycerine and nitroguanidine. The most recent design of propelling charges comes in the form of modules that can be adjusted to achieve the necessary range.
It is all fairly simple stuff however the expertise and infrastructure, and therefore invetsment, required to design, test and manufacture artillery ordnance (barrels and breeches) and ammunition, such that they are safe and suitable for service is significant, and in common with many other aspects of defence has withered since the end of the Cold War, such that at the point of the Russian invasion of Ukraine the European capacity had been reduced to single points of failure and much of the knowledge had retired or deceased. The reinstatement of manufacturing capacity is a huge undertaking and comes with its own set of risks.
The following questions are in no particular order and I have provided some further context.
Ordnance Manufacture
Rheinmetall has announced that a new ordnance manufacture facility will be established in the UK in Telford, presumably at the Rheinmetall BAE Systems Limited (RBSL) site, and be operational by 2027.
As the facility will be constructed by Rheinmetall will it only manufacture Rheinmetall designed ordnance?
Will the facility only produce ordnance for the UK requirements for the Challenger 3 Main Battle Tank (MBT), of which 148 will be produced, and the UK quantity of RCH 155mm, the number to be ordered has yet to be defined?
If so what will the plant do when these have been delivered?
The Challenger 3 is due to enter service in 2027. If production of the complete vehicle system is dependent on UK produced ordnance, what risk does this manufacturing route pose to the programme?
Given the lead time for machinery and the need to qualify the production via testing of the first items manufactured is 2027 a realistic operational date for the plant?
M777 is a towed howitzer that is in service with the US Army and US Marine Corps. The system is subject to US International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).
BAE Systems has announced that it has established a facility in Sheffield for the production of M777 ordnance, a weapon that is not in service with the British Army?
Is this production to refurbish M777 weapons in Ukraine?
Does the plant operate at the discretion of the US Government?
Ordnance Demand
With repeated firings the barrels of artillery weapons wear. The wear on the rifling in the barrel affects the accuracy of the weapon, until eventually it is condemned as the fall of shot becomes unpredictable. The reported rate of fire in Ukraine must be causing significant wear.
Whilst there is intense discussion about the supply of ammunition, how will systems such as PzH2000, Caesar, AS90, Paladin and Archer be sustained as barrels wear?
Is barrel wear no longer an issue?
Commonality
There is much media comment on the amount of 155mm ammunition that should be produced, however this assumes that a 155mm round produced by Company A can be safely fired from an ordnance (breach and barrel) produced by Company B. This was not the case prior to February 2022. Separate and extensive qualification is usually required for this to done safely and the performance (range and accuracy) assured.
How has this been addressed to ease the logistic burden for the Ukraine?
How will this be addressed in the rearmament of Europe?
Ammunition Production
On 12 August 2025 the Financial Times published[1] an article based on an extensive analysis of commercially available satellite information of the expansion of ammunition production across Europe as a result of the EU programme, Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP). The article included the following quotation
EU defence commissioner Andrius Kubilius told the FT that since Moscow’s invasion, Europe’s annual capacity to produce ammunition had increased from 300,000 to reach about 2mn by the end of this year.
If we assume that ammunition means 155mm as that is the focus of the article then:
In October 2023 Defense News reported that France would triple 155mm production in 2024 from 1000 rounds per month to 3000 rounds per month. Given that France is one of the main producers in Europe is this consistent with the two million per year?
If Europe did produce two million rounds per year where would the rounds be stored?
Reference the questions on commonality above which rounds make up this capacity?
Where would training take place?
How would they be transported across Europe?
How many weapons would be needed to consume this ammunition?
How has this investment been planned to deliver a robust supply chain, or will it create unnecessary duplications that will result in excess capacity?
The UK has announced a significant increase in artillery ammunition production.
What is the business case for this investment, when all of the UK AS90 self-propelled howitzers have been donated to Ukraine and the number of RCH 155 systems that will replace them has not been defined?
Also what design of 155mm will be produced?
The UK Strategic Defence Review states:
We will ensure Defence is an engine for growth across the UK, by investing £6bn in munitions this Parliament, including £1.5bn in an ‘always on’ pipeline for munitions and building at least six new energetics and munitions factories in the UK, generating over 1,000 jobs and boosting export potential.
What will these factories produce?
Is this huge investment aligned with NATO allies?
What is the risk of unplanned duplication of capacity across Europe?
Which nation would these factories export to?
Who will operate them?
Given the lead times involved how can £6bn be invested before 2029?
Challenger 3
The Challenger 3 Main Battle Tank (MBT), of which 148 are planned to be fielded, is an upgraded Challenger 2. Therefore the number of Challenger 3 is constrained by the number of Challenger 2 donor vehicles.
Whilst the future of the MBT may be in question, how would this constraint affect any increase in the size of the British Army?
Does this number support the UK commitment to NATO to provide an Armoured Division?
What is the 2025 definition of an Armoured Division?
To what extent is the Challenger 3 programme dependent on the success of the bilateral UK/Germany agreement to qualify Enhanced Kinetic Energy ammunition?
It is the responsibility of all stakeholders in defence to provide some explanation of their plans particularly as defence is demanding a financial sacrifice from the public. These questions whilst valid are not intended to embarrass those with greater knowledge that myself, indeed the answers may be confidential. However it can only benefit defence to take steps to enhance public understanding and provide information that goes beyond the press release.
[1] Europe builds for war as arms factories expand at triple speed – Financial Times 12 August 2025