NATO nations are waking up to the consequences of their defence investment decisions. Since the end the Cold War a combination of an eagerness to take a peace dividend particularly by European NATO allies, a series of counter insurgency conflicts, and a fascination with enablers such as C4I (Command Control Computers and Intelligence) rather than effectors such as so-called dumb ammunition and the associated delivery systems, howitzers and rocket launchers, has dramatically changed the profile of NATO’s capability. The focus of the anticipated Cold War conflict was a land war in Europe utilising tanks, artillery and infantry. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the response of NATO nations is demonstrating the truth that wars are ultimately fought and decided on land, and it is an error to assume that tanks artillery and infantry can be replaced by networks and data and what a former UK Chief of Defence called ‘a little light bombing’.
The laudable NATO support to Ukraine clearly shows that the alliance is dominated by the USA and that even the USA has allowed its ability to engage with peer or near peer adversaries to be depleted to a dangerous level. The Ukraine Support Tracker produced by Kiel Institute for the World Economy shows the extent to which the USA dominates the support to Ukraine that has been vital to success on the battlefield. European nations, including the U.K., are criticised for their lack of support. Some are accused of lacking the political will to support Ukraine, however a more prosaic reason for their lacklustre response is they simply do not have the materiel to go beyond what has been achieved to date.
Ten months into the war even the USA is starting to feel uneasy about the extent to which the flow of materiel particularly ammunition is depleting its stocks. There is talk on Capitol Hill about rejuvenating the defence industrial base to replenish the stocks of Javelins, Stingers, and ‘smart’ and ‘dumb’ 155mm artillery ammunition. European NATO nations have been unable to outload munitions because the stockpiles have been run down such that they barely cover training demands. The European industrial base for munitions has been dramatically reduced since the end of the Cold War to the extent that huge investment is required to create the capacity necessary to rebuild the stockpiles to a level that would deter or match any future aggression. This industrial weakness may have been a calculation in the Russian decision to invade Ukraine and will be a factor again should the USA decide that its’ stocks are too low or those in Congress that do not see the benefit of USA support to Ukraine, only the cost, become able turn off the tap.
For Europe the challenge is clear; the balance of risk indicates that the stockpiles of ammunition should be rebuilt, although this is not a given. If the stockpiles are to be significantly increased, then the industrial base must be expanded. Here lies an opportunity for European defence, which is hampered by fragmentation in military and industrial dimensions. For example, whilst the USA has one type of tank (M1) and howitzer (M109) there are numerous different types in Europe. There are also numerous supply chains for munitions in Europe. Before individual nations commit to rebuilding stockpiles via separate but intersecting supply chains it would be prudent to pause and consider alternative models. Is it feasible to establish a common European family of munitions produced by a robust resilient supply chain? The simple answer is yes, it is feasible. The market for defence materiel, particularly munitions is a monopsony; the buyers shape the market. The supply chain for munitions is relatively complex however it would be a mistake to either leave the design of the munitions supply chain to market forces or to attempt to maintain national structures. An excellent first step would be for the European nations to align their munitions procurements to seek opportunities for commonality and to ensure that a resilient and effective munitions industrial base is developed.